revenue equivalence造句

• For such auctions the revenue equivalence theorem holds.
• By the revenue equivalence theorem if all buyers had the same beliefs, there would be revenue equivalence.
• By the revenue equivalence theorem if all buyers had the same beliefs, there would be revenue equivalence.
• This fact that the revenue is the same is not a coincidence-it is a special case of the "'revenue equivalence "'theorem.
• We establish revenue equivalence by showing that B ( v ) = e ( v ), that is, the equilibrium payment by the winner in one auction is equal to the equilibrium expected payment by the winner in the other.
• Note that here, the revenue equivalence principle does NOT hold the auctioneer's revenue is lower in a first-price auction than in a second-price auction ( revenue-equivalence holds only when the values are independent ).
• This condition in turn yields Myerson's ( 1981 ) celebrated revenue equivalence theorem : the expected revenue generated in an auction in which bidders have independent private values is fully determined by the bidders'probabilities y ^ { \ ast } \ left ( t \ right ) of getting the object for all types t as well as by the expected payoffs V ( \ underline { t } ) of the bidders'lowest types.
• While these authors derived and exploited the envelope theorem by restricting attention to ( piecewise ) continuously differentiable choice rules or even narrower classes, it may sometimes be optimal to implement a choice rule that is not piecewise continuously differentiable . ( One example is the class of trading problems with linear utility described in chapter 6.5 of Myerson ( 1991 ) . ) Note that the integral condition ( 3 ) still holds in this setting and implies such important results as Holmstrom's lemma ( Holmstrom, 1979 ), Myerson's lemma ( Myerson, 1981 ), the revenue equivalence theorem ( for auctions ), the Green-Laffont-Holmstrom theorem ( Green and Laffont, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979 ), the Myerson-Satterthwaite inefficiency theorem ( Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983 ), the Jehiel-Moldovanu impossibility theorems ( Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001 ), the McAfee-McMillan weak-cartels theorem ( McAfee and McMillan, 1992 ), and Weber's martingale theorem ( Weber, 1983 ), etc . The details of these applications are provided in Chapter 3 of Milgrom ( 2004 ), who offers an elegant and unifying framework in auction and mechanism design analysis mainly based on the envelope theorem and other familiar techniques and concepts in demand theory.